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Metamisery and Bodily Inexistence
A Reply to Ying-Tung Lin
Philip Gerrans
The difference between the Cotard Depersonalisation and Depersonalisation Dis-
order may consist, not only in the fact that the Cotard delusion is a response  to
prediction error affective/bodily information, but the level in the predictive pro-
cessing hierarchy at which predictions about bodily information are violated.
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1 Prediction error and veridicality
My explanation  of  Depersonalisation  Disorder
(DPD) argued that the characteristic experience
is shared by people who suffer from the Cotard
Delusion (CD). The difference between the two
conditions is  that  the person with DPD does
not develop a delusional response to her experi-
ence of de-affectualisation. She simply reports is
as it is: “I feel as if my experiences do not be-
long to me”. The person with Cotard, however
develops  an  explanation  of  that  feeling  and
identifies  with it  “I no longer  exist”.  In com-
menting on this proposal Ying-Tung Lin opens
up a range of new possibilities for cognitive the-
orizing. The first is that the predictive coding
approach provides a new framework for cognit-
ive  theorizing  which  improves  on  “second
factor”  approaches to delusion.  The second is
that attention to the predictive nature of  the
processes which generate experience might sug-
gest  an important  difference  between the  two
conditions: namely the role of the Anterior In-
sular Cortex (AIC). 
One  way  to  approach  the  phenomenon
would  be  to  ask  why  the  person  with  DPD
seems to be able to understand that her experi-
ence is not veridical while the person with CD
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does not (modulo all the caveats about the epi-
stemic status of delusional attitudes). The CD
patient for example does not say “It feels as if I
don’t exist” she says “I don’t exist”. This way of
approaching the problem fits with a now stand-
ard approach to delusion, that argues that there
are (at least) two stages of cognitive processing
involved in delusion formation. The first gener-
ates  an anomalous experience and the second
generates a delusional response to that experi-
ence. 
Ying-Tung Lin however, following Hohwy
and Clark, explains delusion in terms of the at-
tempt by higher  order  control  systems to ac-
count for surprisal in a predictive coding hier-
archy. The radical aspect of these ideas is that
neither the precipitating experience nor the de-
lusional  response need be conceived of  as  the
result of cognitive malfunction. Because there is
no intrinsic connection between error minimiza-
tion  and  malfunction  “certain  misrepresenta-
tions  can lead  to error  minimization;  further-
more, it is possible for misrepresentation rather
than veridical representation to lead to a gener-
ative model ”(Lin this collection, p. 8).
Ying-Tung Lin’s commentary applies these
ideas to the Cotard delusion, arguing that it is
a  model  that  mimimises  the  prediction  error
represented  by  depersonalisation  experience.
Her target is to describe a
cognitive architecture [that] could, in prin-
ciple, explain CD in terms of its develop-
ment from depersonalization, and what ex-
actly  are  the  underlying  differences
between patients suffering from the Cotard
delusion  and those  suffering  from deper-
sonalization disorder (DPD) but free from
the Cotard delusion? (Lin this collection,
p. 2)
2 The sense of presence
Before I make some comments, I want to high-
light  the  original  aspects  of  her  account  and
show  how  it  can  explain  how  experience  ac-
quires a quality of “mineness” or “sense of pres-
ence”,  that  is  of  belonging  to a self.  We can
then use the predictive coding framework to ex-
plain how the sense of presence can go missing.
Loss of the sense of presence signals a predic-
tion error which then requires a higher-level sys-
tem to build a predictive model that fits that
error. 
The first point to note is that on the most
radical interpretation of predictive coding ideas
the veridicality of representation is a corollary
of cognition not its primary goal. The primary
goal of a cognitive system is to predict its own
informational  states  consequent  on  its  actions
(broadly construed to include internal regulat-
ory actions). The point is not just that the ob-
jects  of  experience  are  constructed  and hence
may  be  illusory  or  misrepresented.  Rather
veridicality of experience is secondary to the ac-
curacy with which cognitive process predicts the
flow of information in sensory systems. As she
says in the case of perception this means that
“instead of aiming to answer the question ‘what
is  this?’  perception studies  should answer the
question ‘… what does this resemble?’ ”(Lin this
collection, p. 6). This formulation captures the
idea that the visual system, for example, is not
passively  registering  retinal  information  and
constructing  a  representation  of  the  external
world,  but  using  a  model  which  predicts  the
flow of information coming from the retina. 
The first step is to apply the same idea to
interoception. We see that the mind is not pass-
ively registering changes in body state and con-
structing a model of the body accordingly but
predicting the flow of bodily information in cog-
nitive context. Those contexts range from main-
tenance of  homeostasis to the use of  affective
experience  to  inform  decision-making  and  re-
flective cognition. Thus when I think about the
past or future these episodes of retrospection or
prospection  are  infused  with affective  signific-
ance. 
The radical import for the understanding
of pathologies of self-representation is very eleg-
antly brought out by her discussion. Ying-Tung
Lin in effect argues that the experience of the
self in autobiographical episodes is no more dir-
ect than experience of the world in perception
or of past events in memory. In each case no ob-
ject  is  directly  represented  or  experienced.
Rather the relevant object in each case (object
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of perception, remembered event, or self in the
case of first person awareness) is  inferred as a
part of a process of optimizing predictive accur-
acy in specific cognitive contexts. 
As many have argued the role of the An-
terior Insular Cortex (AIC) is to integrate and
represent affective information: i.e., those bodily
states, which tell the organism how it is faring
in  the  world,  actual,  imagine  or  remembered.
The point  to recall  from Ying-Tung Lin’s  ac-
count is that the AIC is not representing a self
but constructing and optimizing a model that
predicts  the  flow of  affectively-charged  bodily
information.
This is why when AIC is hypoactive the
subject feels a loss of subjective presence, repor-
ted as depersonalization. In particular the pa-
tient has a loss of subjective presence for her
own body: she registers changes in body state
but they do not feel  affectively significant for
her. Because that lack of feeling is not predicted
she then reports it in the vocabulary of DPD. 
Why does the DPD patient not proceed to
something like the Cotard delusion? According
to Ying-Tung Lin whether a delusion is formed
depends on the degree of precision assigned to
the information produced by hypoactivity in the
AIC. 
In the case of Cotard delusion developed
from depersonalization,  when one has the ex-
pectation of high precision, the system tends to
be driven by the bottom-up predictive error of
unexpected  hypoactivity  of  the  AIC,  rather
than the prior model.  One is,  therefore,  more
likely to revise  the model in order to explain
away the surprisal resulting from the mismatch
between  the  actual  and  predicted  activation
level of the AIC; that is, the systems of patients
suffering  from  CD are  driven  by  an  urge  to
modify their top-down predictive models in or-
der to con- form to the loss of AIC activity. The
construction of the model in CD is considered
an attempt to minimize prediction error.
3 Conclusion
Reading over this account I wonder if there is
an alternative interpretation available consistent
with the predictive coding account. It is consist-
ent with the view that patterns of activity in
the AIC are abnormal in CD, but unlike DPD
those patterns are not the result of VLPFC-in-
duced hypoactivity. 
Ex hypothesi the CD patient is extremely
depressed.  Evidence  suggests  that  circuitry
centred  on  the  amygdala  is  affected,  which
means  that  online  affective  responses  are
flattened. 
The  role  of  the  AIC  is  to  monitor  for
changes driven by affective processing. It thus
predicts  for  example  that  a  typically  positive
event  would  be  processed  as  positive.  Thus,
when  that  event  is  processed  as  negative  or
neutral,  the AIC detects an error,  signaled in
the form of an anomalous experience. The pa-
tient is in the position being able to detect and
signal changes in her affective responses, which
take the form of unpredicted absences in bodily
response. Thus her lack of felt bodily response is
processed as affectively significant in the Cotard
delusion with the result that she experiences it.
Thus she does not feel neutral she feels miser-
able. Or as we might put it  she feels metam-
isery because the role the AIC is to enable the
person to feel the affective significance of bodily
changes  including  the  absence  of  predicted
changes. In Cotard delusion the patient feels the
affective significance the unpredicted absence of
positive changes.
In DPD, by contrast, the patient does not
feel  the significance of  bodily information be-
cause her AIC is inhibited and hypoactive.
Thus the difference between the two condi-
tions may consist, not only in the fact that the
Cotard delusion is a response to lower level pre-
diction error, but the level in the predictive pro-
cessing  hierarchy  at  which  predictions  about
bodily information are violated.
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